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Background: Lassa fever (LF) is a viral haemorrhagic fever endemic in West Africa. Lassa
virus is maintained in and spread to humans from rodents, with occasional secondary
human-to-human transmission. Present recommendations for personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) for care of patients with LF generally follow those for filovirus diseases.
However, the need for such high-level PPE for LF, which is thought to be considerably less
transmissible between humans than filoviruses, is unclear.
Aim: In Nigerian Lassa Treatment Centres (LTCs) we aimed to describe current PPE
practices, identify barriers and facilitators to implementation of existing guidance, and
assess healthcare workers’ understanding. This would inform the development of future
PPE guidelines for LF.
Methods: We performed a mixed-methods study, including short cross-sectional surveys of
PPE used in LTCs, observations of practice, and in-depth interviews with key informants. We
described the quantitative data and we conducted a thematic analysis of qualitative data.
Findings: Our survey of 74 HCWs found that approximately half reported problems with
recommended PPE. In three LTCs PPE was used highly variably. Full PPE, as recommended
in Nigeria CDC guidelines, was used in less than a quarter (21%) of interactions. In-depth
interviews suggested this was based on availability and HCWs’ own risk assessments.
Conclusion:Without specific guidance on Lassa, the current approach is both resource and
labour-intensive, where these are both limited. This has led to low adherence by health
care workers, whose own experience indicates lower risk. The evidence-base to inform
PPE required for LF must be improved to inform a more tailored approach.
ª 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd
on behalf of The Healthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
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Lassa fever (LF) is an acute febrile illness whose effects
range from asymptomatic infection to serious multiorgan dys-
function, haemorrhage, neurological manifestations and death
[1,2]. The disease, caused by Lassa virus (family Arenaviridae),
is endemic across large areas of West Africa, where it is
maintained in and spread to humans primarily in the “multi-
mammate rat” Mastomys natalensis) [3], with occasional sec-
ondary person-to-person transmission, particularly in hospitals
with inadequate infection prevention and control (IPC) [4,5].
Current recommendations for personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) for care of persons with LF generally follow those
for viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) caused by Ebola and Marburg
viruses (family Filoviridae) [6]. However, the infectivity of
Lassa virus is thought to be considerably less than the filovi-
ruses, [3,7e9], calling into question whether such high-level
PPE, which poses considerable logistic and financial chal-
lenges, is truly indicated. Furthermore, currently recom-
mended PPE for LF allows for little evaporative cooling,
severely limiting HCWs’ ability to provide care, especially in
the generally hot climates where LF is endemic.Background
Much of the published literature on PPE for LF consists of
case reports from imported cases to high-income settings (To
see results of a systematic literature review conducted in
advance of this study please refer to Appendix 1). These cases
have resulted in no secondary clinical infections thus far, and
only two reported seroconversions [10], even when LF was not
suspected and standard precautions were employed [11]. A
recent report on an imported case in Germany concluded: “Use
of PPE including gloves, gowns, masks and goggles is effective
in prevention of transmission.” [12]. Outbreak reports in health
care settings from low- and middle-income settings have all
occurred in non-specialist clinical settings [13,14] and have
often related to invasive procedures such as surgery [15]. No
investigations of PPE requirements for LF in endemic areas for
the disease have been reported.
Recognising these challenges, the World Health Organ-
ization recently set out preferred product characteristics for
PPE for LF, emphasising the need to improve current ensembles
[16]. The World Health Organization and the Cochrane review
[17] both highlighted significant gaps in knowledge around PPE
design, preferred types of PPE and best practice for donning
and doffing.
To explore barriers and facilitators for implementation of
PPE for LF, and to inform future guidelines, we explored cur-
rent practices in three Lassa Treatment Centres (LTCs) in
Nigeria.Methods
Research design
We used a mixed-methods approach, utilising a triangu-
lated design [18]: 1) a short cross-sectional survey for HCWs,
2) observations of IPC practices in LTCs, and 3) in-depth
interviews with key informants. The cross-sectional
survey of HCWs’ perceptions of risk and protectivemeasures for LF was a structured, interviewer-administered
questionnaire. We used a broad convenience sampling
technique to recruit all HCWs who were working during each
visit to three LTCs. We defined HCWs as doctors, nurses, and
others including laboratory technicians, social workers,
hygienists, and care assistants in accordance with standard
classification [19,20]. Observations of IPC practices in the
LTCs comprised a direct, overt visual audit of practice, with
a checklist based on Nigeria Center for Disease Control
guidelines [21].
We collected data using Open Data Kit forms designed by
the team and piloted at Federal Teaching Hospital Abakaliki
(FETHA). We performed observations and administered sur-
veys at three LTCs; Irrua Specialist Teaching Hospital (ISTH)
in Edo state, FETHA in Ebonyi state, and Federal Medical
Centre Owo (FMC Owo) in Ondo state. These sites are in
endemic areas and care for over 80% of all confirmed LF
cases in Nigeria [14]. We spent five days at ISTH, three at
FETHA, and four at FMC Owo. All elements of the data col-
lection were completed concurrently while we were at each
site. We conducted 19 in-depth interviews, including nine at
ISTH and five each at FETHA and at Owo. Some interviewees
worked across sites or at state or national levels. Inter-
viewees were senior staff who had experience with LF across
a range of domains, including clinical care, policy develop-
ment, and public health. We used a topic guide to direct the
conversation to preidentified themes (see Appendix 4 for the
Topic Guide), with free discussion. Informants consisted of
policy makers and clinicians identified through purposive
sampling and progressive snowball sampling. Interviews were
recorded and conducted in English. We transcribed and
anonymised the interviews into Nvivo (v12). A systematic
form of thematic analysis was conducted [18,22], data were
coded into the preidentified themes and subthemes, as well
as novel codes that arose from the data. Transcripts and
coding were independently reviewed by another team
member. Transcripts were then revisited to ensure coding
consistency, and differences resolved through team dis-
cussion and developing consensus. Due to time restrictions
at the sites, member checking of transcripts was not a fea-
sible process.
We analysed data using Stata SE14 (descriptive and com-
parative analyses). We coded survey data (free text data) and
in-depth interviews using Nvivo 12, taking a thematic approach
that incorporated both inductive and deductive components
[18,22]. We disaggregated quantitative data by location,
demographic variables, training and experience.
Findings
Cross-sectional survey
We surveyed 74/106 (70%) of all HCWs, 31 at ISTH, 15 at
FETHA and 28 at Owo, of whom 47 (64%) were female and the
median age was 36 years (range 22e58 years) (Figure 2 in
Appendix 2). HCWs were comprised of 33 (45%) nurses, 12 (16%)
doctors, and 29 (39%) consisted of a range of other health
workers (Figure 1).
Other health workers a range of non-professional and pro-
fessional staff such as hygienists (who are responsible for tasks
such as waste management and disinfection of reusable PPE),
Cleaners, Porters, Social Workers and medical specialists.
Figure 1. Respondents to survey.
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at their LTC, they noted frequent stock outs for individual
items, such as gloves (57, 77%) and cover-all suits (51, 69%).
HCWs reported subtle variations of PPE use between sites,
for instance, at both FETHA and Owo, there was higher
reported use of N95 masks, hoods, and boots while at ISTH
there was higher reported use of surgical as opposed to N95
masks, a preference of surgical caps over hoods, and slip-on
shoes rather than boots (See Figure 1 Appendix 2).
Half of all HCWs reported problems wearing the recom-
mended PPE ensemble, especially cover-all suit (45% reported
difficulties); 13 (87%) HCWs reported issues at FETHA, where
a thicker yellow suit is provided, versus only 11 (36%) at ISTH,
where a lighter version and locally made alternatives are
available. Problems reported included overheating, dehy-
dration and restriction of movement. Gloves were the next
most problematic, with 18 (24%) HCWs across sites reporting
ripping or perforating, and perceived variable quality. Next was
goggles for which 11 (15%) respondents reported fogging and
reduced visibility. Although FETHA had been supplied with anti-
fog spray by their NGO partner, HCWs still reported problems.
HCWs at Owo preferred visors or abandoning goggles altogether
and risk working with no eye protection to avoid this issue.
However, when worn, HCW confidence in the protection pro-
vided by the current PPE ensemble was high, with 32 (43%)
reporting that they felt “Always protected e 100% of the time”
and 42% reporting “Effective protectione between 75e100% of
the time”; the remaining 15% thought PPE was less than 75%
effective, with two (3%) HCWs saying protection was less than
50%.
Respondents reported various factors affecting choice of
PPE, with the main drivers being risk of exposure to bodily
fluids (34, 46%), type of procedure carried out (36, 49%),
severity of patient illness (22, 30%) and availability of PPE (17,
23%). (Full results of the survey are available at Appendix 2)Observations on PPE in practice
We completed 34 observations, 26 (76%) at ISTH and 8 (24%)
at Owo. No observations were possible at FETHA since there
were no cases there during the period of study. Observations
were with nurses 17 (50%), doctors 7 (21%) and a range of other
health workers 10 (29%) and were classified by the rationale for
entering the high-risk zone (e.g. giving medications, taking
blood samples or decontamination and cleaning) (Figure 2).We observed the process of PPE donning by HCWs entering
the high-risk zone. While most (91%) donning occurred within
the designated area, that figure fell to 73% for doffing. PPE was
disposed of in the appropriate waste stream 76% of the time.
The full ensemble as prescribed by Nigeria Centre for Disease
Control guidelines [21] was worn in only 20% of interactions.
Some components of the PPE were used almost universally
while use of others was substantially varied between sites and
HCWs. For example, scrubs were worn under PPE during 91% of
observations, with only 3 HCWs wearing their own clothes
underneath PPE (all doctors). Gloves were worn in 97% of
interactions, but double gloves only in 62%. At Owo, all HCWs
wore almost identical ensembles e scrubs, cover-all suits,
boots, N95 masks, aprons and double gloves. The only variation
observed was whether HCWs wore goggles or a visor. By con-
trast, at ISTH, use of surgical masks and surgical caps was high
but use of double gloves was low (observed in only 54% of
interactions at that site). At ISTH there was mixed use of cover-
all suits and gowns, and slip-on shoes were predominantly
used, instead of boots.
Comparing cross-sectional survey data and observations,
there were seven items of PPE for which we observed a differ-
ence between reported and observed use. Of these only scrubs
had higher observed-to-reported use. Items reported to have
much higher usage than observed were double gloves, aprons,
goggles, N95 masks, hoods and boots. All 21% of HCWs who wore
goggles, N95 mask and boots were based at one site (to see full
data from the observations please refer to Appendix 3).Interviews with key informants
The analysis revealed consistency across sites relating to
how availability of PPE, risk assessment, length of admission,
patient symptoms and medical procedures affected protective
measures taken. A range of themes were identified and a
number of these are explored and interpreted below, along
with illustrative quotes from LTC clinicians. An overview of all
the major themes identified is in Appendix 4.
Theme: availability and quality of PPE
Many respondents discussed a general lack of availability of
PPE in LTCs and cited a variety of reasons. Unpredictable
patient loads were perceived to threaten the supply chain and
add to difficulties planning for supplies. At some sites an NGO
had helped with availability issues. There was also discussion of
how people respond to and resolve these issues.
‘The supply is not constant, so that is why we are not supplying
[wearing] it. We know that it is in the guidelines, but we don’t have
it.’
‘Sometimes we don’t have PPEs and, whether we are here, if we
don’t have PPE to use we can’t say we are not going to attend to the
patient.’
Many respondents talked about availability issues that arose
not from total absence of supply, but because of incorrect
products being provided, with poor-quality PPE or wrong sizes
sometimes being supplied. In particular, there were quality
concerns about risk of breach, inappropriate materials and
poor fitting.
‘Some of the PPE [cover-alls] are not appropriate. Some are too
small, like I remember some of the ones we wore in the past and
Figure 2. Subjects of observations.
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or incomplete and then some that the gloves are poor quality, or the
PPEs are poor quality.’
Many respondents remarked that PPE guidance and practi-
ces had changed over time, especially in regard to the 2013e16
West Africa Ebola virus disease epidemic, with the perception
that PPE guidelines had become stricter and more extensive as
a result of that outbreak. Respondents questioned whether this
was appropriate.
‘We didn’t know what was called PPE, I was using my ward coat and
did not use all those things and people were surprised that I didn’t
come down with it.’
‘During the Ebola outbreak, because you don’t know which is Lassa
and which is Ebola, because somebody’s come in with fever and you
think it might be other forms of viral haemorrhagic fever, so you
want to put on the full PPE.’
‘But after 2014, that’s when I started seeing more generous PPE,
which actually came from Ebola scare, and the first impression that
Lassa was like Ebola. The dividing line is wide. Lassa is not Ebola.’
Some respondents noted that supply of PPE is also an issue
outside of LTCs because LF patients are sometimes cared for in
non-specialist clinical areas due to delayed diagnosis or atyp-
ical presentation. PPE was used inconsistently in these areas.
‘In accident and emergency the only difference is that we don’t
wear gowns, there is no gown.’
‘In the ward then we are not actually having PPE. It was more of
using your hand gloves and your face masks.’Personal risk assessment
Many respondents spontaneously discussed their approaches
to HCW personal risk assessment, with procedures, patient
clinical presentation, and clinical area being the main factors
that respondents used to assess their own risk. Different tasks
or procedures were perceived by respondents as having higher
or lower risk. Surgical interventions were generally seen to
carry the highest risk of infection. Participants drew largely on
empirical knowledge as opposed to formal training to make
their assessment.
‘This full PPE is not truly necessary for all patients for all proce-
dures. For instance, if I am just going in to serve medication or serve
food, I don’t need to wear the full PPE because whether people like
it or not Lassa is not as virulent as Ebola.’‘Unfortunately, epidemics among the HCWs were coming from the
surgical department who really could not detect them until they
had issues controlling bleeding and such and at which time the
viremia was really high and the prognosis was poor. Over time we
have had doctors and nurses who have been infected. Most of them
survive, but we have lost a few.’
When assessing risk, many respondents categorised
patients, with frequent use of terminology of ‘wet’ or ‘dry’.
Other respondents used terms such as ‘very bad’, ‘severe dis-
ease’, ‘classic’, or ‘highly toxic’. Most participants used such
descriptors to explain how they assessed risk.
‘Wet symptoms were defined by diarrhoea, vomiting, bleeding,
coughing. If they have any of those ones. I say give them single
isolation, while those ones that have dry symptoms we could cohort
them because, from our experience, we don’t think the trans-
mission is very high among those.’
‘Usually some patients are wet, and some patients are dry. Whenwe
look at the patient and we see that they are wet we have to wear
the full PPE, but for patients that are not wet we just have to make
sure that we are wearing the N95, that we are wearing the gloves of
course, and the gown, and our scrubs before the gown, and we
carefully take our samples.’
‘The full overall PPE is very important when the patients are wet,
but when you’ve been managing patients the symptom are abated
they are not wet, you use the light PPE.’
In addition to “wet” and “dry” status, respondents dis-
cussed other clinical factors that they perceived to affect
potential risk of transmission. Patients with neurological
complications were perceived to present a higher risk because
their behaviour could be unpredictable.
‘When the person is also having seizure, the person will not coop-
erate. That is a dangerous patient, because I remember that I had
something like prick (needlestick) when the patient was not
cooperating.’
‘Maybe the patient is confused and irrational. You don’t know what
is going to happen, how they are going to behave. He might take the
syringe off me and just (mimes a needle prick).’
Longer admission time, presumably as a proxy indicator of
patients entering convalescent stages, was often understood to
reduce risk. Accordingly, respondents reported assessing risk as
lower for these patients whose transmissibility was perceived
to have waned.
‘We should have different shades of PPE. The reason is that, if the
patient has been on the ward for at least 5e10 days, you don’t need
to wear the complete PPE. For that patient you could wear a sur-
gical apron that is properly covered, wear your double hand gloves,
wear your boots to see the patients, so you can reduce the quantity
of PPE you use on the patient.’Discussion
VHF is a syndromic diagnosis of a disease that can be caused
by over 30 different viruses from four taxonomic families of
virus. These families and viruses may possess drastically dif-
ferent biological properties. Guidelines on PPE for VHF clinical
care have generally been developed with filovirus outbreaks in
mind and emphasised adherence to strict PPE ensembles,
including detailed procedures for donning and doffing
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Nigeria and across most of West Africa, in which costs and long-
term maintenance of appropriate IPC practices must be
maintained indefinitely, HCW approach to the use of PPE may
vary considerably.
Indeed we found HCWs in Nigeria to be taking a much more
nuanced approach to PPE. In the absence of specific IPC
guidelines for LF, HCWs appear to be mitigating risk based on
product availability, balancing local norms and interpretation
of guidance documents, and personal preference. Risk assess-
ments by HCWs were pragmatic and often included severity of
clinical symptoms and type of clinical procedure, either of
which could increase exposure to blood or bodily fluids and risk
of transmission. While these approaches may be pragmatic and
logical, such extreme variation in interpretation and practice,
with reliance on each individual’s personal judgement, may
entail risks for the HCW who judges incorrectly. It is also
important to note the practical difficulties with availability of
PPE. Were standard VHF guidelines implemented in full, the
resource demands, already substantial, would likely be
unsustainable.
We recognise numerous limitations to our study. The find-
ings from three LTCs in Nigeria may not be generalisable to
other hospitals or wards in Nigeria or elsewhere, although we
feel that it is highly probable that HCWs across West Africa face
similar challenges and limitations with regard to PPE for LF and
may well adopt similar coping strategies. While there is little
comparable data from LTCs specifically, other clinical settings
in Nigeria (such as TB or Obstetric units) have recently reported
similar PPE availability issues [25,26] along with other locally
developed strategies to mitigate the implications of this, such
as asking family members to procure PPE or HCWs changing
their behaviour when providing patient care. This reinforces
the issue of PPE insufficiency in other Nigerian health settings.
Our focus was on HCWs, and did not include family care givers,
who often care for patients in LTCs, supported with variable
levels of PPE and training. There is presently no universal
guidance for family care givers.
While we worked to reduce influence of social desirability
bias and observer effects during the study, this may have
occurred, leading to over-estimation of use of PPE. A clear
example of participant reactivity occurred when a nurse pre-
pared to enter the high-risk zone wearing scrubs, slip-on shoes
and a mask and, upon observing a member of the study team,
returned to the donning area to dress in a cover-all suit and
gloves. We triangulated data wherever possible using multiple
data sources to minimise these effects. The qualitative data
helps provide some context for the variation we observed in
practice and in response to survey questions. There may also
have been misclassification of critical concepts during surveys
or key informant interviews, as the work was conducted in
English, in which not all HCWs were fluent.
The timing of the study may also have influenced findings; it
was conducted in August, a time of year when the incidence of
LF is typically lower, which limited the number of cases for
which we could make observations in practice. In addition,
while several new and acutely unwell patients were admitted
during the study, none had haemorrhagic or ‘wet’ symptoms. It
may be that, if such patients were admitted, PPE selection and
HCW practices would have been different.
The present guidance for PPE use for LF in West Africa,
based on experience with filoviruses (and still controversialeven for these viruses), is neither evidence-based nor sus-
tainable. First and foremost, research is required to better
characterize the true nature and risk of person-to-person
transmission of Lassa virus, as opposed to other causes of
VHF. Secondly, policy and IPC guidance must consider the cost
and logistical challenges to year-round maintenance of LTCs in
endemic areas, making sure that such guidance is implement-
able within the confines of available resources. Safe disposal
and limiting environmental contamination through waste are
other important factors to consider. Innovative approaches for
PPE for all VHFs are needed to accomplish these goals. Rec-
ognising this, an expert Working Group on PPE Innovations has
been established by the World Health Organization, although
the focus to date has been primarily on the filoviruses. We also
recognise that PPE is only one element of effective IPC and that
any risk assessment or improvement plan should be fully inte-
grated with other programmatic, engineering and admin-
istrative controls [27] and not addressed as a single control
measure in isolation.
The HCWs in this study typically work with severely ill
patients in the context of a transmissible disease. It is
imperative that efforts are made to enable them to work as
comfortably and safely as possible. Some respondents in this
study reported that a more nuanced and limited use of PPE
has not been implicated in HCW LF transmission in LTCs, in
that there had been no reported clinical infections among
staff.
However, we do not yet know if HCWs are at significantly
greater risk of contracting disease (or sub clinical infection
identified through serological investigation) if they work in
LTCs or other non-specialist health settings, in comparison to
the general population. The only serological study so far
conducted in an LTC in an endemic country (Sierra Leone) was
limited in scope but HCWs did not show increased prevalence
in relation to the general population [28]. There have how-
ever been outbreaks of nosocomial Lassa reported following
surgical or obstetric procedures in general health facilities
and these have claimed the lives of both HCWs and patients
[4,13,15,29].
There are certainly many financial and operational consid-
erations related to use of PPE and significant investment and
product development are required to determine the appro-
priate standards and level of PPE [30] to protect HCWs. How-
ever, improved evidence on specific risk of transmission of LF in
clinical settings could encourage less extensive use of PPE in
particular contexts, facilitate HCW work, and allow resources
to be directed more efficiently.
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Ölschläger S, et al. Hospital-based surveillance for Lassa fever in
Edo State, Nigeria, 2005-2008. Trop Med Int Heal 2012;17:1001e4.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-3156.2012.03010.x.[3] Inegbenebor U, Okosun J, Inegbenebor J. Prevention of Lassa
fever in Nigeria. Trans R Soc Trop Med Hyg 2010;104:51e4.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trstmh.2009.07.008.
[4] Fisher-Hoch SP, Tomori O, Nasidi A, Perez-Oronoz GI, Fakile Y,
Hutwagner L, et al. Review of cases of nosocomial Lassa fever in
Nigeria: The high price of poor medical practice. BMJ
1995;311:857. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.311.7009.857.
[5] Lassa fever n.d. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/
detail/lassa-fever (accessed November 22, 2020).
[6] Hersi M, Stevens A, Quach P, Hamel C, Thavorn K, Garritty C,
et al. Effectiveness of personal protective equipment for
healthcare workers caring for patients with filovirus disease: A
rapid review. PLoS One 2015;10. https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0140290.
[7] Lo Iacono G, Cunningham AA, Fichet-Calvet E, Garry RF, Grant DS,
Khan SH, et al. Using Modelling to Disentangle the Relative Con-
tributions of Zoonotic and Anthroponotic Transmission: The Case
of Lassa Fever. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 2015;9:e3398. https://doi.org/
10.1371/journal.pntd.0003398.
[8] Ogbu O, Ajuluchukwu E UC. No TitleLassa fever in West African
sub-region: an overview. J Vector Borne Dis n.d.;44:1e11.
[9] Jeffs B. A clinical guide to viral haemorrhagic fevers: Ebola,
Marburg and Lassa. Trop Doct 2006;36:1e4. https://doi.org/
10.1258/004947506775598914.
[10] Kofman A, Choi MJ, Rollin PE. Lassa fever in travelers from West
Africa, 1969e2016. Emerg Infect Dis 2019;25:236e9. https://
doi.org/10.3201/eid2502.180836.
[11] Fisher-Hoch SP,CravenRB,Forthall DN, Scott SM,PriceME,PriceFM,
etal. Safe intensive-caremanagement of a severe caseof lassa fever
with simple barrier nursing techniques. Lancet 1985;326:1227e9.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(85)90752-4.
[12] Lehmann C, Kochanek M, Abdulla D, Becker S, Böll B, Bunte A,
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